Little is known about the response of physicians to changes in compensation: Do increases in compensation increase or decrease labour supply? In this paper, we estimate wage elasticities for physicians. We apply both a structural discrete choice approach and a reduced-form approach to examine how these different approaches affect wage elasticities at the intensive margin. Using uniquely rich data collected from a large sample of general practitioners (GPs) and specialists in Australia, we estimate 3 alternative utility specifications (quadratic, translog, and box-cox utility functions) in the structural approach, as well as a reduced-form specification, separately for men and women. Australian data is particularly suited for this analysis due to a lack of regulation of physicians' fees leading to variation in earnings. All models predict small negative wage elasticities for male and female GPs and specialists passing several sensitivity checks. For this high-income and long-working-hours population, the translog and box-cox utility functions outperform the quadratic utility function. Simulating the effects of 5% and 10% wage increases at the intensive margin slightly reduces the full-time equivalent supply of male GPs, and to a lesser extent of male specialists and female GPs.
INTRODUCTION
A critical task for health care policy is to ensure the long-term supply of medical services for an ageing population and an increasing demand for health care. To address the seemingly persistent disequilibrium in physician labour markets (World Health Organisation, 2013) , national policy responses have largely focused on changing the number of medical graduates (McPake, Scott, & Ijeoma, 2014) , the geographic distribution of physicians and the use of financial incentives, particularly pay-for-performance systems, to improve access to health care.
Though remuneration and financial incentives for physicians are increasingly focused on rewarding quality and performance, changes in earnings per hour from any payment method are also likely to influence the number of hours worked. For example, the introduction of pay-for-performance can increase earnings per hour and quality of care for patients, and through increased hourly earnings, it can increase or decrease hours worked depending on whether the labour supply curve is backward bending. In turn, changes in hours worked influences access to care for patients as hours worked influences how many patients can be seen by a physician. Thus, if hours worked fall as earnings per hour increase, this could potentially reduce access, including equity of access, which is one of the key objectives in many health systems.
Despite a vast general labour supply literature (see e.g., Blundell, MaCurdy, & Meghir, 2007) and shortages of doctors in many developed countries, the labour supply of doctors has received surprisingly little attention; evidence exists only for two (very different) countries, the United States and Norway. Most studies that examine doctors' labour supply apply a reduced-form approach specifying a log-linear relationship between hours worked and the wage rate (Sloan, 1975; Rizzo & Blumenthal, 1994; Showalter & Thurston, 1997; Thornton, 1998; Ikenwilo & Scott, 2007) . However, this popular specification linearises the equation in log wages at the observed labour supply point, imposes a constant wage elasticity for all doctors, and ignores potential heterogeneities. Imposing a constant wage elasticity is particularly problematic because wage elasticities should decline at higher hours of work due to an increased marginal utility of leisure relative to utility of income.
We provide evidence on the determinants of doctors' labour supply by using very rich data from a unique Australian study of doctors, "Medicine in Australia: Balancing Employment and Life" (MABEL). We estimate structural and reduced-form models and compare the estimated wage elasticity from both types of models for doctors with different characteristics. Australian data are particularly suited to estimate physicians' wage elasticities due to a lack of regulation of fees charged by physicians, which provides the required variation in earnings for estimation.
We contribute to the literature in four ways. First, we estimate a structural discrete choice labour supply model that has gained increasing popularity in the general labour economics literature. A few studies, for example, Cheng, Kalb, and Scott (2017; Andreassen, Di Tommaso, and Strøm 2013; and Saether 2005) , apply a structural labour supply model to physicians but mainly examine choices between different types of jobs (e.g., public versus private). The discrete choice approach offers a number of advantages compared to the continuous approach, including the flexibility of the functional form, the relative ease of incorporating complex non-linear tax and transfer systems, the broader range of utility functions that can be used, and no need to impose quasi-concavity conditions a priori. The discretisation of working hours may be particularly appropriate for general practitioners (GPs) who often have a limited number of working hours to choose from due to institutional constraints affecting their labour supply supply (for general populations and doctors, respectively, see Van Soest,Woittiez, & Kapteyn, 1990; Saether, 2005) .
Second, we explore heterogeneous responses by providing a detailed analysis for different subgroups of doctors. Whereas previous studies have relied on small samples and estimated models for male and female doctors combined, or models for male doctors only, our larger sample allows for separate models by gender and doctor type. Given an increasing proportion of female doctors, it is important to estimate separate models by gender. Third, we explore the sensitivity of the models' implications to the utility function specification and to using a different number of discrete labour supply choices. This is relevant to the broader labour supply literature as well, particularly in relation to high-income individuals. Finally, we use different specifications of the structural discrete choice approach to simulate labour supply responses at the intensive margin in response to wage increases of 5% and 10% taking into account the non-linearity of the tax schedule.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review on physicians' labour supply and summarises the reported wage elasticities. This is followed by a brief description of the Australian institutional setting in Section 3. Section 4 outlines the two types of labour supply models and the associated estimation approaches. In Section 5, we describe the data and discuss some descriptive statistics. Section 6 presents the results, including a policy simulation. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications in Section 7.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The earliest studies on the determinants of doctors' labour supply, for example, Feldstein (1970) , Fuchs and Kramer (1972) , Brown and Lapan (1972) , run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the quantity of services provided by a GP on different control variables and a fee measure. These U.S. studies generally find small negative fee elasticities that are measured imprecisely due to small sample sizes. Sloan (1975) uses U.S. census data from 1960 and 1970 and finds small positive wage elasticities (<0.1) on average as well as evidence for a backward-bending labour supply curve for a minority of doctors at the top of the income distribution. Rizzo and Blumenthal (1994) model labour supply and the wage rate jointly based on a sample of young self-employed physicians from the 1987 Practice Patterns of Young Physicians Survey. The study estimates the model for men and women e combined and finds a positive wage elasticity of 0.23. Showalter and Thurston (1997) study the effect of changes in state marginal tax rates on labour supply and find significant positive wage elasticities for self-employed physicians (0.33), but small (0.10) and insignificant wage elasticities for doctors on wages or salaries. Using the same data, Thornton (1998) estimates very small positive wage elasticities (0.06) for male, self-employed, solo-practice physicians and concludes that reductions in medical fees are unlikely to decrease the supply of medical services.
For Norway, Baltagi, Bratberg, and Holmås (2005) use administrative data from 1993 to 1997 for male hospital physicians and apply different estimators to their labour supply model, exploiting a natural experiment in which some doctors received a 15% wage increase while others did not. Estimating the labour supply model by generalised method of moments (GMM), they find significant positive wage elasticities of around 0.3.
The above studies all use a reduced-form approach. Only a small number of studies use a structural discrete-choice approach. Using administrative data for Norwegian residents in 1995 and 1997 , Saether (2005 estimates a structural discrete choice labour supply model for doctors aged 28-66, both employed and self-employed. He finds wage elasticities for hospital physicians ranging broadly from 0.1 to 0.2. He also shows that private sector wage increases lead to stronger changes in hours worked in the relevant sector than public sector wage increases.
Most recently, Andreassen et al. (2013) use Norwegian administrative data from 1996-2000 to estimate a labour supply model that allows doctors to choose between 10 job packages that are derived from a combination of attributes: partor full-time work, hospital or primary care, public or private sector, with "working in other sectors" and "not working" representing the 9th and 10th package. The study focuses on all employed married physicians and finds an average wage elasticity of 0.04.
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Physicians in Australia are paid in two main ways. First, medical specialists can be employed by public hospitals on a salary, or a salary with rights to practice. This enables them to either see private patients in public hospitals where the hospital receives the revenue and the physician may receive a salary bonus or in-kind benefit (e.g., attendance at conferences). Rights to private practice means they can also see private patients in private hospitals or in their own consulting rooms. Unlike the United States, medical specialists in private practice do not organise into large medical groups, and largely practise on their own while sharing administrative support. All GPs work in private practice in small medical groups with nurses and sometimes allied health. GPs are gatekeepers to specialist care.
Second, both GPs and specialists who work in private practice can charge fees to patients, with no regulation as to the level of fees. Medicare is Australia's tax-financed universal health scheme, which provides a fixed subsidy to patients for each visit, procedure, or test performed by GPs and specialists in private practice. The fixed subsidy is determined by the Medicare Benefits Schedule. If physicians charge above the subsidy, then patients face a copayment, which varies across physicians. This copayment cannot be covered by private health insurance. Eighty percent of GP visits are charged at the level of the Medicare subsidy, so patients do not face a copayment. This is known as bulk-billing, and subsidies are higher for GP consultations for patients under 16 and patients with concession cards, providing incentives to bulk-bill these groups of patients. Only around 25% of specialist services are bulk-billed. There are additional incentive schemes including the Practice Incentive Program, to encourage GPs to provide certain services to patients, such as after hours care, chronic disease management, immunisations, cervical screening, and payments for working in nonmetropolitan areas. Patients of GPs do not need to enrol or register with their GP.
Between 1997 and 2013, average working hours of Australian doctors have fallen from 48.0 to 42.8 hr. A number of factors contribute to the observed changes in working hours. First, the share of female doctors has increased substantially as women account for only 24% of doctors aged 55 and over, compared with 52.5% of doctors aged 35 and under. These changes in gender composition affect labour supply, because female doctors work 38.8 hr per week on average compared to 45.4 hr for males. Second, at the same time, men have also reduced their working hours, and relatively more so than women over time. 1 Third, the proportion of older doctors has increased over the past 10 years, which resulted in a significant drop in average working hours as older doctors tend to work fewer hours. Fourth, Markwell and Wainer (2009) and Shrestha and Joyce (2011) document the changing work/life balance expectations amongst doctors. In addition, studies of retirement intentions suggest that one third of GPs plan to retire before age 65 (Brett, Arnold-Reed, Hince, Wood & Moorhead, 2009 ).
METHODS

A structural labour supply model
Our central analyses use a structural model of individual labour supply to estimate preference parameters and elasticities with respect to income and wages. We treat labour supply as a discrete choice problem rather than a continuous choice (e.g., Van Soest, 1995) .
As in standard labour supply models, we assume that doctors choose a combination of hours worked and household net income that maximises their utility. We follow Löffler, Peichl, and Siegloch (2014) and compare three utility functions: the quadratic, translog, and Box-Cox. The quadratic specification (e.g., Keane & Moffitt, 1998 ) is quite flexible, without imposing too many restrictions a priori, as individual leisure and consumption can be either substitutes or complements. 2 Furthermore, unlike other utility functions, the quadratic utility function takes working hours rather than leisure as its arguments and therefore does not require choosing an arbitrary value for the total endowment of time.
Alternatively, we estimate a translog utility function (e.g., Van Soest, 1995) , which has the same advantages as the quadratic utility function except that it cannot be directly expressed in working hours but needs to be in terms of leisure. To compute leisure time, we choose 168 as the total amount of time available per week. Finally, to ensure that the results are not driven by the choice of utility function, we also estimate a Box-Cox utility function (e.g., Saether, 2005) . 3 We again choose 168 hr per week as the total endowment of time. For all three utility specifications, we check postestimation whether utility is quasi-concave at the observed labour supply point and thus consistent with economic theory (Varian, 1992, pp. 115-118) .
We assume that each doctor i can choose between j alternatives from a limited set of m combinations of income and working hours, {( y ij , h ij ); j = 1, 2, … , m}, where y ij is the household's net income, which includes other household income such as a partner's income or the doctor's nonlabour income, associated with the doctor's working hours h ij . We specify the three utility functions as follows.
The quadratic utility function:
The translog utility function:
The Box-Cox utility function:
In all three specifications, we assume that the random error ij follows a type I extreme value distribution and estimate the parameters as a multinomial logit model by maximum likelihood. Furthermore, we always allow the vector of preference parameters 1 and 3 to differ by some individual characteristics, for example, the number of children, the doctor's age, and health status.
Given the above models and assuming that individuals choose the alternative that leads to the highest utility, the probability that individual i chooses alternative j (from the m alternatives) is
To estimate these probabilities, we need to determine the utility level and thus the household net income associated with each choice j. To generate household net income, we first compute gross hourly wages either directly from observed information or by using wage regressions. Using gross hourly wages, we calculate gross labour income associated with each choice of working hours. We then add nonlabour income and the spouse's gross income to generate gross household income. Finally, we apply the Australian tax and transfer system to generate the amount of net household income associated with each level of working hours. 4 Consistent with the previous literature (e.g., Saether, 2005; Andreassen, Di Tommaso & Strøm, 2013) , we only vary policy parameters that affect the doctors and do not model their partners' labour supply choices, which remain exogenous in our framework. Ideally, we would like to jointly model the labour supply of both spouses for couple families. Unfortunately, the data available do not provide information on partners' working hours. 5 For our analysis, we choose discrete labour supply points that cover the observed labour supply as well as possible. Hence, our main model offers 10 choices of working hours: 16, 20, 30, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, or 70 hr per week. 6 We also examine the sensitivity of results to choosing a smaller and larger number of labour supply points: 5 (allowing 20, 40, 50, 60, or 70 hr per week) and 13 (allowing 8, 16, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65 , or 70 hr per week).
A reduced-form labour supply model
Starting from the same economic framework of utility maximisation (see Stern, 1986) , and a few simplifying assumptions and approximations (such as linearising wages at the observed labour supply point), we derive a reduced-form static labour supply model as in Equation 5:
where the natural logarithm of hours worked (H i ) is regressed on (the log of) the gross wage rate (W i ), (the log of) gross other nonlabour income (Y i ), and a range of individual characteristics X, for example, the age of the doctor, number of children and age of the children. The parameter 1 yields the uncompensated substitution elasticity (Blundell & MaCurdy, 1999, p. 1,599) . This reduced-form approach imposes a number of restrictive assumptions that the structural discrete choice model does not require. First, the model estimates a constant wage elasticity 1 . The linear specification is fairly restrictive as the wage elasticity may vary over the hours distribution or depend on nonlabour income or other demographic characteristics. Second, the reduced-form model also assumes quasi-homothetic preferences, which empirical studies on consumer behaviour (Blundell & MaCurdy, 1999, p. 1,687) typically reject. Third, the reduced-form specification includes the gross wage without allowing for non-linearity of the wage after applying the rules of the tax and transfer system. In effect, the equation is linearised in the wage at the observed labour supply point.
Despite these shortcomings, the model nevertheless provides an interesting benchmark against which to compare the average wage elasticity derived from the structural model. In addition, it allows for a comparison to the literature using the reduced-form approach.
The wage equation
Because we compute hourly wages by dividing total weekly income by the weekly hours of work (see Section 5.2), wages are likely to be endogenous and subject to measurement error transmitted through measurement error in weekly hours of work. By definition, we introduce spurious negative correlation between observed hourly wages and weekly hours of work whenever weekly hours of work are observed with error. Borjas (1980) explains how this relationship between observed hourly wages and hours worked, which is present in most labour supply studies, will bias wage elasticities downwards whenever measurement error is present in the hours of work variable.
To address the endogeneity of wages, we pursue three main strategies. First, we follow the literature (including Borjas, 1980) in using imputed wages instead of observed wage rates as our preferred specification. We estimate wage regressions separately by doctor type and gender following Cheng et al. (2012) including several variables that are not included in the preference parameters 1 and 3 of the utility functions in Equations 1, 2, or 3, or in X in Equation 5 as exclusion restrictions. These include attending medical school in Australia, number of postgraduate qualifications, type of postgraduate qualification, temporary visa holder, work experience, state of residence, remoteness indicators, local median house price, practice size (only for GPs), main speciality type (for specialists only), and percentage of time in clinical work (see Table  A .I). 7 To compute gross income at each labour supply point based on the parameter estimates from the wage equation, we predict gross hourly wage rates, multiply these with the hours worked at the relevant labour supply point, and compute other (nonlabour and partner's) income in the same way as for the observed wage approach.
Our main approach involves the estimation of a wage equation by ordinary least squares using the first wave of data:
where w i captures gross hourly earnings for individual i, the vector x i consists of a number of explanatory variables (including the variables listed as exclusion restrictions above), and i is a normally distributed error term. In the reduced-form specification of labour supply, we can test for relevance and validity of the instruments through a first-stage F-test and the Sargan overidentification test, respectively. Second, to address the concern that the exclusion restrictions of the main wage imputations may not hold, we estimate an alternative version of the wage equation where we use the same structural and reduced form models as before, but now base the labour supply estimations on the third wave of the MABEL data. In this specification, we use lagged observed wages from waves 1 and 2 as instruments for observed wages in wave 3 to avoid reverse causality as suggested by Reed (2015) . This approach also deals with unobserved heterogeneity given instrument validity, which we can assess through an overidentification test.
Estimating wage equations for relatively homogeneous groups such as medical doctors/specialists can be difficult. For example, there is unlikely to be much variation in education level, which traditionally explains a substantial proportion of wage variation between individuals. Therefore, we check the sensitivity of results to a third alternative specification of the wage equation based on more data, utilising the first four waves instead of just one wave. This uses additional information without relying on time periods that are too distant from wave 1:
where w it captures hourly earnings for individual i at time t, c i denotes the unobserved individual-specific effects (or heterogeneity), and the vectors x 1it and x 2i consist of time-varying and time-invariant regressors, respectively. Wages for the same doctor in different years are correlated, so it is necessary to control for this correlation in our estimation. The 1 parameters of the model can be consistently estimated using conventional estimators such as fixed-effects or first-differencing estimators. These approaches, however, are not practical in our application as they do not permit estimating coefficients on time-invariant covariates (e.g., medical speciality and medical school in Australia), which are important predictors of doctors' earnings.
An approach that accommodates both individual heterogeneity and time-constant covariates is the correlated random effects model, originally proposed by Mundlak (1978) and extended by Chamberlain (1982) . Decomposing the individual heterogeneity term c i = +x
, and is some constant, w it can be written as
where it is usually assumed that E(a i |x) = 0 and E( it |x) = 0. The parameters of the model may be estimated using the pooled ordinary least squares estimator, which produces fixed effects estimates of the time-varying coefficients, as well as estimates of the time-invariant variables. For unbalanced panels, which applies in our context,x i is calculated as the time average of x it over the number of time periods that are observed for each individual i (Wooldridge, 2010) . We report these additional robustness tests alongside our main results in Section 6.
DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
MABEL survey
This paper uses a unique longitudinal survey of doctors, MABEL, which covers many topics related to labour supply, for example, characteristics of the work setting, workload, income, geographic location, demographic characteristics, and family circumstances. Joyce et al. (2010) provide a detailed discussion of the study design and show that the cohort is nationally representative with respect to age, gender, geographic location, and hours worked. In our main analysis, we use data from the first wave of the MABEL survey, conducted in 2008, on qualified GPs and specialists working in clinical practice. Selecting doctors working in clinical practice only means that we can examine labour supply responses at the intensive margin but cannot analyse the decision to work in clinical practice. 8 For additional robustness checks concerning wage endogeneity, we also use data from waves 2 to 4.
Construction of income variables
To construct the key argument in the utility function, net income at each labour supply point, we need information on (a) the gross hourly wage earned in medical practice and (b) gross other household income. The MABEL survey collects information on gross or net income reported per fortnight or annually, and separately asks for income from the medical practice and for total household income. 9 If doctors provide weekly or fortnightly income figures, we assume that this income was the same over all weeks/fortnights worked to impute an annual income value. We divide annual medical income by annual hours worked in the medical practice to compute the gross hourly wage earned in medical practice. We either use observed gross hourly wages directly in the labour supply model, or as the dependent variable in the wage equations to predict hourly wage rates as described in Section 4.3. We compute gross other household income by subtracting the income from medical practice from total household income. Other household income thus includes the doctors' income from other sources and, for cohabiting doctors, the partner's labour and nonlabour income, or a mix of these sources.
Using the relevant tax and family support rules from 2008, we compute net income from gross income. Because of individual taxation and a lack of detail about the partner's income, we are required to make a few assumptions about the split of other household income. First, if the partner is working (either full-or part-time), we allocate all other income entirely to the doctor's partner. Second, if the partner is not working, then we split the other household income equally between both spouses assuming that the couple aims to maximise tax benefits (e.g., to use the tax-free income threshold).
To address the sensitivity of results with respect to measurement error in the partner's income or other household income, we also apply three alternative approaches (briefly described in Table A .II) to construct these two measures of income both when using observed wages and imputed wages. The estimated wage elasticities from these alternative approaches are very similar to those from the base case approach. 10 Thus, our results are robust to the different approaches taken to compute the doctor's medical earnings, the division between the partner's earnings, and other household income.
Summary statistics
We present descriptive statistics for our estimation sample on average hours worked by gender, doctor type, and age in Figure 1 , together with the proportions of women in each age group. First, the proportion of women decreases with age and is largest amongst the younger cohorts. Second, men and women differ markedly in their labour supply over the life cycle. For instance, women in their prime child-rearing ages (30-49) work the lowest average hours. Conversely, women aged 50-59 work the longest hours amongst women, which is likely to be due to children having grown up by this stage. 8 However, given the high investment in human capital required to become a doctor, relatively few qualified doctors do not work in their profession. The AIHW (2010) reports that about 7% of all registered medical practitioners do not work in the medical workforce. This number includes non-GPs and nonspecialists, for whom the nonparticipation rate may be higher than for GPs and specialists. 9 Although the response rate for the financial variables is lower than for some of the other questions (Kuehnle et al., 2010) , the majority of GPs and specialists (85.3%) provide either gross or net income. 10 Results based on observed wages (circumventing the need to estimate three additional sets of wage equations) are available in Table A .II (rows 2 to 4). Figure 2 presents the distribution of observed working hours by gender and doctor type. It shows that women work fewer hours than men and, for GPs and specialists, women represent the majority of the part-time doctors (e.g., less than 40 hr). Second, specialists are more likely to work long hours than GPs. Furthermore, the observed distribution of hours worked suggests that a broad range of working hours is on offer to doctors, facilitating the supply of preferred hours without facing major demand side constraints. 11 Table 1 contains the summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis and reveals several differences in socio-economic characteristics between the four groups of doctors. As expected, specialists earn more per hour than GPs, and in both groups, women earn less per hour than men (also see Schurer, Kuehnle, Scott & Cheng, 2016 Note. GPs=general practitioners.
can be clearly observed in Figure 3 , which also reveals an inverse-U relationship between wages over the life cycle of male doctors, where wages are highest for the age group 50-59. For women, wages vary much less with age, with the one exception of female GPs aged 70-79, which is, however, a small group of GPs.
RESULTS
Performance of alternative utility function specifications
We begin our analysis with a comparison of the goodness of fit measures for the three utility functions. In contrast to other studies (e.g., Van Soest, 1995; Hanel, Kalb, & Scott, 2014) , the quadratic utility function violates the quasi-concavity conditions in the majority of cases for our sample of highly paid doctors working long hours. Table 2 shows that the utility function is quasi-concave for only 17% of female GPs, 57% of female specialists, 15% of male GPs, and 23% of male specialists. The other two utility functions perform much better in this regard. When using the translog specification, the quasi-concavity conditions are fulfilled for the vast majority of observations. The results for the Box-Cox utility are quite similar, but we were not able to estimate a Box-Cox model with the interaction term between income and hours worked included for female GPs. 12 Given the quadratic u n d e r 3 0 3 0 3 9 4 0 4 9 5 0 5 9 6 0 6 9 7 0 7 9
Male Female FIGURE 3 Distribution of observed hourly wages, by age group, gender, and doctor type specifications' failure to fulfil the quasi-concavity conditions for a large number of observations and the difficulties in getting the Box-Cox models to converge, we use the translog utility function as the benchmark specification in this paper. 13 With regard to the other goodness-of-fit measures, there is relatively little difference between the specifications, or the preferred specification is a different one for the different doctor groups. The average predicted hours are nearly all the same in the different utility specifications, with predicted hours being slightly higher than observed hours in all groups and for all specifications. The proportion that is correctly predicted is quite similar for the different specifications (with the highest proportion being for a different specification for the different doctor groups). The proportion that is correctly predicted is higher for women than for men and is higher for GPs than for specialists across all specifications. Based on the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria, a different specification is preferred for each of the doctor groups.
Estimated marginal effects on labour supply
This section discusses the results from the structural labour supply model with 10 discrete hours points based on the translog utility function (for coefficients, see Table A .III). We present simulated marginal effects (expressed in absolute hour changes) and their 95% confidence intervals in Table 3 . 14, 15 Table 3 reveals interesting similarities and differences between the four doctor groups. As expected, young children reduce working hours for all groups; this reduction is largest for female GPs (who are expected to work on average 11.52 hr less if a child aged 0-4 is present compared to having no children under 16), and then female specialists and male GPs. For women, the effect of the total number of children, although insignificant, compounds the negative effect of the youngest child, whereas for men, the effect of family size is positive and significant, thus making the combined effect of the child variables ambiguous and dependent on the age and number of children. Our results are consistent with the findings by Wang and Sweetman (2013) .
Reflecting the observed decline in working hours across the age distribution, increasing age by 1 year decreases labour supply for all doctor types, except for female specialists. Health status appears somewhat important for GPs but not for specialists. Having good health instead of very good or excellent health increases the expected hours of work, especially for female GPs (note that we cannot exclude the possibility of reverse causation). Few doctors have poor or fair health.
The marginal effects of having a partner reveal some interesting patterns. If the partner is not employed, female doctors tend to work more hours than single female doctors, whereas it makes no difference to male partnered doctors compared 13 Because the Box-Cox model for female GPs did not converge, we report results from the Box-Cox model without interaction terms between income and hours worked for this group. However, note that results for the other groups (Table 4 , Panel B) show that excluding the interaction reduces the size of the predicted wage elasticity. 14 We compute the 95% confidence intervals using the percentile method within a parametric bootstrap approach (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005) . 15 In further sensitivity checks, we show that the results are robust to changes in the utility function (Table A. Note. Shaded cells indicate the best performing model on the criterion described in the first column of that row. GPs=general practitioners. a Model estimated without interaction terms between income and hours worked for this group.
to single male doctors. Men generally seem nonresponsive to their partner's working status. If the partner is in full-time employment, female specialists and GPs work slightly fewer hours compared to single women. Finally, self-employed doctors and GPs working in remote areas of Australia work more hours than other doctors.
Wage elasticity
In this section, we use the estimated parameters for a range of different specifications to predict individual doctors' responses to a 1% increase in individual wages interpreting these as the wage elasticities. 16 Table 4 reports average elasticities for each of the specifications. 17 A number of important points stand out. First, we observe negative average wage elasticities for male and female doctors, GPs, and specialists, indicating that the estimated working hours of many Australian doctors correspond to the backward bending parts of their labour supply curves. The elasticities are modest in size and range in value between −0.06 and −0.23. The negative wage elasticities are mostly significant for both men and women, except for the estimates using imputed wages for female specialists.
Second, Panel A shows that the negative wage elasticities are not driven by the choice of the number of discrete labour supply points allowed in the specification of the discrete choice model. Five, ten, or thirteen midpoints yield very similar results, except perhaps for female GPs for whom the model with 5 midpoints appears to introduce substantial measurement error by not covering the observed distribution of labour supply well enough.
Third, the estimated negative wage elasticities are quite robust on average against using observed or imputed wages. The point estimates are never significantly different from each other, although some of the estimates using imputed wages are not significantly different from zero due to the loss of precision. 16 For self-employed doctors who are not paid an hourly wage but are reimbursed for patients seen or services delivered, we can interpret this as a 1% increase in the reimbursement fee. 17 A similar approach as described in footnote 14 is used to compute the 95% confidence intervals. Fourth, Panel B shows that the implied wage elasticities are very similar when using the quadratic utility function or the full Box-Cox utility function (with interaction terms between income and hours) as compared to using the translog function. This similarity is surprising given the poor performance of the quadratic utility function in terms of meeting the quasi-concavity conditions at the observed labour supply points. The largest difference is again observed for female GPs. The reduced Box-Cox specification, which omits the interaction between income and hours, converges for all groups but produces substantially smaller, but still negative, wage elasticities.
Fifth, the table shows that structural and reduced-form approaches (Panel C) produce strikingly similar wage elasticities on average for each of the four subgroups, except for female GPs. 18 The similarity indicates that the constant wage elasticity estimated in the reduced-form approach is consistent with the average elasticity in the structural discrete choice approach.
In addition to these main results, we carry out several sensitivity checks, including using lagged wages as instruments for current wages, using four waves of data to impute wages, accounting for wage prediction errors and working hours mismatches, using alternative wage definitions, and investigating differences by employment status. Table A.II 18 Given the large proportion of female GPs working part-time hours, there is likely to be more variation in wage elasticities between female GPs than within the other groups. As a result, the assumption of a constant wage elasticity across all female GPs (implied by the reduced-form approach) may be a more restrictive assumption for this group. The full Box-Cox function includes an interaction term between income and hours worked as in Equation 3. c
We obtain the imputed wages from the wage regressions presented in Table A .I. d In the IV regressions, we control for the same variables as in Table A .VII, and instrument for the wage using the equation presented in Table A .I. in the Appendix shows that our main results are robust to these additional checks, which also alleviate concerns that measurement error and wage endogeneity might bias our findings. 19 The advantage of using a structural approach becomes clear when we present the variation in estimated wage elasticities of individual doctors from the baseline model graphically as in Figure 4 . The figure clearly shows that wage increases lead to heterogeneous responses. These cannot be incorporated in the reduced-form model but can be reflected through the structural model. Although the probability mass is mostly to the left of zero, reflecting negative wage elasticities on average, a small proportion of doctors are estimated to have positive wage elasticities.
Finally, we want to reveal the potentially heterogeneous effects for subpopulations, which health authorities could target specifically. Therefore, Figure 5 presents the estimated wage elasticities for a number of selected subgroups. Generally, the groupings in the figure do not clearly identify particular groups that would respond more strongly to wage increases than other groups. The subgroup analysis shows that the labour supply of specialists (and particularly male specialists) does not respond much to wage increases. As expected, male and female GPs working longer hours have on average slightly larger negative wage elasticities than doctors working fewer hours. The only subgroups that stand out slightly are female specialists with a nonemployed partner who are the only group to respond positively on average, although insignificantly, to a 1% increase in wages. Doctors with a preschool child (except for male specialists) have a very small negative average wage elasticity close to zero and are more likely to have a positive wage elasticity than other groups.
Policy simulations
Finally, we use the structural model to simulate doctors' labour supply responses to additional increases in the wage rate of 5% and 10%. We calculate the labour supply responses as the percentage change in hours per week and in terms of the absolute change in full-time equivalent (FTE) doctors. FTE is a meaningful measure of supply because it takes into account differences in hours worked amongst doctors. We calculate the FTE measure by multiplying the number 19 In the context of the reduced-form approach, the validity of the instrumental variables that we use to predict wages in our main approach can be assessed through an overidentification test. Although the instruments of our main specification do not pass the overidentification test, once we use a quadratic experience term in the wage equation, leave out "percentage of time in clinical work", and omit "practice size" (for GPs) and "specialty dummies" (for specialists), the test is passed. When re-estimating the wage elasticities in the structural models using this specification, we obtain results that are similar to our main results (results are available upon request). Thus, although our main specification does not pass the Sargan test, we reach the same conclusions regarding the negative wage elasticities when using a more parsimonious specification of the structural model or when using lagged wages as instruments, with both specifications passing the Sargan test in the corresponding reduced-form context. However, the parsimonious specification leaves out important variables that are particularly relevant for the more rigid reduced-form model. Borjas (1980) noted a similar sensitivity to inclusion/exclusion of specific variables in reduced-form labour supply models. Therefore, we prefer to keep these in our main model. of medical practitioners in the population by the average change in weekly hours worked and dividing the result by the number of hours in a standard full-time working week. 20 The simulation results are shown in Table 5 together with the 1% wage increase from Table 4 . We first examine the results presented in Panel A, which displays the relative labour supply responses. Overall, the models predict negative and significant labour supply changes for men, but not for women. The predictions are quite robust across the three utility specifications, apart from female GPs for whom results are quite sensitive to the utility function used.
Moreover, the 5% and 10% wage increases lead to fairly linear relative changes using the translog and Box-Cox utility specifications, but less so when using the quadratic specification. A notable exception from the linear response patterns are female GPs when using the quadratic utility function, where the wage responses follow a U-shaped pattern.
Panel B presents the absolute change in terms of FTE for the current population of doctors. A 5% wage increase is predicted to reduce the total number of FTE female GPs by about 0.2-1%, and for female specialists by about 0.3-0.4%, which is consistent with the modest relative wage responses by female doctors. For male GPs, a 5% (10%) increase in wages is predicted to reduce their labour supply by about 0.9-1% (1.6-1.9%). Finally, 5% and 10% wage increases would decrease the total number of FTE male specialists by 0.4-0.5% and 0.9-1.1%, respectively. That male GPs and specialists respond more strongly than female GPs and specialists is consistent with the theory of a backward bending labour supply curve and the summary statistics presented in Section 5, which showed that male doctors earn higher incomes and work longer hours than female doctors. The policy simulations therefore provide evidence that wage increases in the order of 5-10% may reduce labour supply slightly in the short-run, but more so for male than female doctors. 20 We use 40 hr for a standard full-time week consistent with the measure used by the National Healthcare Agreement reporting. 
CONCLUSION
Although the World Health Organisation (2013) predicts that most OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries will face a substantial shortage of physicians in the next years, little research exists about doctors' labour supply. We analyse the pecuniary and nonpecuniary determinants of doctors' labour supply and examine the policy implications arising from different modelling approaches for labour supply. Our study exploits the advantages of the structural discrete choice approach and compares the results to those obtained with a reduced-form approach, frequently used in the literature on physicians' labour supply. Using a rich and unique data set on Australian physicians, MABEL, we make four main contributions to the literature on doctors' labour supply. First, a structural discrete choice model for labour supply is estimated for each of our four physician groups (male and female GPs and specialists). In our second contribution, we make use of the rich data, which allow us to perform a detailed subgroup analysis that no other study on doctors' labour supply has done before.
Third, we show that all modelling approaches used in this paper predict small negative wage elasticities for male and female GPs and specialists. Given doctors' high income levels and long working hours, it is not surprising that increasing the return to hours worked has no positive effect on their labour supply. Many doctors are working so many hours that the cost of giving up another hour of leisure is very high while the benefit from additional income is limited. As a result, wage elasticities are negative on average, although a number of individual doctors would still have a positive labour supply response. A broad range of robustness checks show that these results are robust when we account for the endogeneity of wages.
The results are not very sensitive to different definitions of nonlabour and other household income, different utility specifications, different specifications of the discrete sets of working hours or including unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. This is despite the fact that for this high-income and long-working-hours population, the quadratic utility function, which is often used in general population labour supply modelling, does not fulfil coherency conditions in a large proportion of cases. The translog utility function and Box-Cox utility function have no such problem and are thus consistent with economic theory.
Finally, we use the structural model to predict relative and absolute labour supply changes in response to different wage increases. Unlike the reduced-form approach, the structural model facilitates ex ante policy simulations that explicitly take into account the non-linear taxation schedule or financial subsidies and allows for heterogeneous wage elasticities. Our policy simulations show that male doctors respond more strongly to wage increases than female doctors. A 5% increase in wages is predicted to reduce the total labour supply by male GPs by about 1%, and by about 0.5% for male specialists. Our results imply that wage increases aimed at increasing the supply of medical doctors at the intensive margin are likely to do the opposite and reduce labour supply, especially by male doctors. Our results relate to short-run impacts only because the intensive margin and not the extensive margin is investigated.
In our policy simulation, we focus on the effects at the intensive margin as MABEL collects information on doctors working in clinical practice, and in addition, only the intensive margin can be affected in the short run. In the long run, increased wage rates may draw in additional doctors, but given the long qualification period of doctors, it is likely to take several years before any effect would be observed. Moreover, relatively few qualified doctors are likely to be absent from the medical workforce. The most notable exceptions are probably female doctors on maternity leave and recently retired doctors. These groups might respond to some extent to increased wage rates, but the net effect is ambiguous. The relevant group that is at risk of retirement (all doctors aged 55 and over) makes up 28.9% of all doctors. Higher wages may allow doctors to finance a comfortable retirement more quickly, or it may incentivise doctors to stay in the workforce longer because the opportunity costs of not working as a doctor are high. This needs to be determined empirically in future research.
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